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SUBCONTRACTING CLAUSES UNDER SECTION 8(e)
OF THE NLRA
Robert J. Hickey
Introduction
It should surprise no one familiar with the law of subcontracting and its
anti-Teamster origins that this aspect of our labor legislation stands in very
real need of clarification. The purpose of this article is to discuss and analyze
the coverage of Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
and in doing so to analyze the difference between subcontracting clauses and
"hot cargo" clauses.
Subcontracting means the transfer of unit work from the employees in
the unit to other employees outside the unit and usually in another plant.' As
noted by the Supreme Court in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,'
the terms "subcontracting" or "contracting out" have no precise meaning and
"are used to describe a variety of business arrangements.... 
." A "hot cargo"
clause, on the other hand, is described and prohibited in Section 8(e)':
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and
any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or
implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease
or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise
dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease
doing business with any other person, and any contract or agree-
ment entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agree-
ment shall be to such extent unenforcible and void....
The difference between the two has been explained by then Professor Archibald
Cox:
In a literal sense this [subcontracting] clause is an agreement be-
tween an employer and a union by which the employer undertakes
not to do business with any other person, but it has a different
function than the contracts which were the targets of Section 8(e).
This restriction upon subcontracting seeks to protect the wages
and shop opportunities of the employees covered by the contract
by forbidding the primary employer to have work which employees
might do, performed outside his own shop . . . something quite
different in both purpose and effect from arranging to have secon-
dary employees boycott non-union firms or specified employers or
groups of employers because their labor policies are objectionable.3
I While the term is generally meant to cover transfer of work from a plant of one employer
to a plant of another employer, it can include the transfer of work to other bargaining units of
the same employer. The employer has a right to allocate work in any nondiscriminatory manner
and an agreement to so allocate work is not, of itself, discriminatory. The units deprived of the
work can seek their own contract clause or can file a motion to clarify their representation cer-
tificate with the Board or can force an assignment by the Board under a Section 10(k) proceed-
ing. See, e.g., Milk Drivers Union (the Minnesota Milk Co. case), 133 N.L.R.B. 1314 (1961).
2 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
3 Id. at 215 n.8 (dictum).
4 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 704(b), 73
Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. V, 1964). '
5 Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 34 (1960).
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I. Clauses Not Within the Wording of Section 8(e)
A. Any Employer: Section 2(2) defines "employer" as excluding the
United States Government, a United States corporation or bank, any state or
political subdivision thereof and nonprofit hospitals. Thus, Section 8(e) would,
on its face, exclude agreements between unions and nonstatutory employers.
The problem arises in the "handling products" clause since this clause applies
only to the products of "employers." The "cease doing business" clause, on the
other hand, is much broader since it applies to a cessation of business with any
person.6
B. To Enter Into: The maintenance or reaffirmation of an existing con-
tract clause has been held by the Board to constitute "entering into."' If such
a clause exists the parties must affirmatively disavow it.8 However, the main-
tenance, reaffirmation, or lack of disavowal must occur during the six-month
period prior to the filing of the complaint with the Board.'
C. Contract or Agreement, Expressed or Implied: The main purpose of
Section 8(e) is to outlaw certain agreements. There is nothing in the statute
to indicate that normal rules of contract law do not apply in determining
whether a contract exists. The sole difference between "contracts" and "agree-
ments" appears to be one of formality. There is no requirement that the agree-
ment be in writing. The difference between express and implied contracts is
that an express contract is manifested by words, oral or written, and an implied
contract is manifested by conduct, circumstances or relationship of the parties
showing that the parties intended to make a contract." Under these terms it
would appear that all that is required to establish an unlawful objective is
evidence disclosing conduct by the union attempting to force or require an
employer to cease doing business with another person and acquiescence by
the employer."
D. Handling Products Clause: Section 8(e) outlaws two basic types of
agreements. The first comprises those agreements "whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer."
Under such a clause, it is not necessary that the employer himself handle the
product. In fact, the Board recognized that employers handle products normally
through their employees. The Board held a clause invalid which forbids an
employer from disciplining an employee who refuses to handle "hot cargo."' 2
6 National Labor Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101, as amended, 61 Stat. 137(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1958).
7 Los Angeles Mailers Union (the Hilbro Newspaper Printing Co. case), 135 N.L.R.B.
1132, 1137 (1962).
8 Automotive Union (the Greater St. Louis Automotive Trimmers case), 134 N.L.R.B.
1363 (1961).
9 National Labor Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101, as amended, 61 Stat. 146
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1958).
10 The Board has mistakenly interpreted "implied" to mean an agreement which has the
intended effect of an illegal clause. Truck Drivers Union (the Patton Warehouse case), 140
N.L.R.B. 1474, 1491 (1963).
11 Express and implied contracts are mutually exclusive, thus each must be litigated on its
own merits in order to find a violation.
12 Amalgamated Lithographers, 130 N.L.R.B. 985 (1961).
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The Board, while noting the right of an employee on his own to refuse to
handle "hot cargo," also noted that in such circumstances the employer has
the correlative right to require the employee to work or be discharged. Thus,
a clause which merely preserves to the employer this choice would be valid
but any clause which goes beyond this by taking away the employer's right to
discharge would be an invalid Section 8(e) clause since the actual effect of
such a clause is to cause a cessation of business.
The next question is whether the term "products" encompasses "services!'
for purposes of Section 8(e). The Board in the context of Section 8(b) (4) (B)13
has interpreted "products" so broadly that it encompasses almost all economic
activity. In Lohman Sales, the Board stated: "so far as human effort is con-
cerned, labor is the prime requisite of one who produces. 1 4 This interpretation
of "products" was applied by the Board to Section 8(e) in Arden Farms.'
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Servette"6 rejected a narrow interpretation of
"products." However, the question remains whether "products" is coextensive
with all forms of "services." In Servette the Supreme Court did not expressly
adopt the rationale of Lohman Sales and, in fact, indicated some limitation by
citing the Fair Labor Standards Act.1 Under the FLSA, an employee is cov-
ered only if he is engaged in actual or fringe production." In Mitchell v.
Zachry0 the Supreme Court held that in order for new construction to come
within fringe production either a facility of commerce or a facility of produc-
tion must be constructed. " In Mitchell v. Lublen, McGaughy & Associates,2
the Court indicated that construction of a defense facility would be considered
a facility of commerce. One may infer from these cases that the construction
of private homes would not come within the term "production."
Even if "products" includes services, only those products of another em-
ployer are covered by the handling products clause. Neither products of the
contracting employer nor those of his employees are protected. While a clause
whereby an employer agrees to allow his own employees the right not to handle
his own products would not come within the "handling products" clause, it
probably would come within the "cease doing business" clause.
The Board, like the Restatement of Agency, has adopted the test of con-
trol as determinative of whether an individual is an employer or an independent
contractor. A better test, suggested by Professor Mechem in his Outlines of
Agency is:
13 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 704(a), 73
Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (Supp. V, 1964).
14 International Bhd. of Teamsters (the Lohman Sales case), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 907
(1961).
15 Joint Council of Teamsters (the Arden Farms case), 141 N.L.R.B. 341 (1963), aff'd,
NLRB v. Joint Council of Teamsters, 338 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1964).
16 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
17 Id. at 55.
18 Actual production includes all steps which lead to readiness for putting goods into the
stream of commerce. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 503 (1945).
Fringe production covers only closely related processes or occupations directly essential to the
production of goods.
19 362 U.S. 310 (1960).
20 Id. at 321. See also Mitchell v. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427 (1955).
21 358 U.S. 207 (1959).
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was the individual carrying on what, according to the habits of the
locality, would be thought by a reasonable man as rising to the
dignity of a trade or profession, and was he hired by the contractor
to do a job for him under circumstances which could fairly be
regarded as suggesting that the contractor intended only to con-
tract for achieving a result and did not mean to dictate the methods
or to control the doing of the job?22
E. Cease Doing Business Clause: The second type of agreement prohibited
by Section 8(e) is that whereby an employer agrees "to cease doing business
with any other person." The major issue here is whether this language covers
a clause in which the employer agrees to refrain from doing business with other
persons who at the time of the agreement are not existing persons identified
in the minds of the parties. There is no decision by the Board on this point.
The issue was raised but left open by the Board in Arden Farms Co.2" However,
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals discussed the issue.2 The
District Court Judge commented:
Without the necessity of here defining the difference between
"cease" and "refrain," it is enough to note that there is a differ-
ence, by the inclusion of both phrases in one clause and of only
one in the second clause. It appears clear that the omission of
the word "refrain" was a considered omission, and this Court will
not subvert whatever reason for such an omission may have been.25
When this case reached the Court of Appeals by way of the enforcement pro-
ceedings, the Court rejected the above view and found that the "refrain" clause
would be covered "by the cease doing business" clause. The Court reasoned
(1) that the words "cease" and "refrain" have the same meaning, (2) that,
even if they are different, Congress treated them as the same, (3) that Congress
might have left the word out by mistake and the Court would correct this mis-
take by interpreting "cease" to include "refrain," and (4) that the clause was
intended to be a catchall. 2 However, this reasoning fails under close scrutiny.
Webster's New International Dictionary defines "cease" as "to come to
an end; to stop; to leave off or give over; desist" and defines "refrain" as "to
hold back; to restrain; to check. ' 27 The Board in Centlivre Village Apartments'
held that the "cease doing business" language of Section 8(b) (4) (B) covered
only clauses aimed at existing identified subcontractors." Thus, a refrain clause
could be enforced without violating Section 8(b) (4) (B). Section 8(e) was
meant to fill a loophole in Section 8(b) (4) (B) and not to broaden its coverage.
22 MECHEM, OUTLINES op AGENCY § 431 (4th ed. 1952). RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §
220 (1) (1958) states: "A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of an-
other and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject
to the other's control or right to control."
23 Joint Council of Teamsters (the Arden Farms case), 141 N.L.R.B. 341 (1963).
24 NLRB v. joint Council of Teamsters, 338 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1964); Hoffman v. joint
Council of Teamsters, 230 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (injunction proceeding). Since this
was an enforcement proceeding and since the Board had not specifically passed on the point, the
Circuit Court's decision could be considered dictum.
25 Hoffman v. Joint Council of Teamsters, supra note 24, at 691.
26 NLRB v. Joint Council of Teamsters, 338 F.2d 23, 27 (9th Cir. 1964).
27 WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 429, 2094 (2d. ed. 1960).
28 Northeastern Indiana Bldg. Trades Council (the Centlivre Village Apartments case),
1964 CCH LAB. L. REP. f 13386 (Sept. 4, 1964).
29 Id. at 21415.
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By construing Section 8 (e) and Section 8 (b) (4) (B) in harmony, "cease" in both
sections must be given the same meaning and should not be made to include
"refrain."
This conclusion is supported by legislative history. Section 8(e) was first
proposed by Senator Gore"0 and was applicable only to motor carriers. His
proposal read:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for .any labor organization and
any employer who is a common carrier... to enter into any con-
tract .. .expressed or implied, whereby such employer ceases or
refrains or agrees to cease or refrain, from handling or transporting
any products of any other employer.
Senator Gore, after agreeing to a suggestion by Senator McClellan to include
the term "cease doing business," restated his amendment:
The purpose of the amendment is to declare and make it "an unfair
labor practice for any labor organization and any employer who
is a common carrier . . . to enter into any contract or agreement,
expressed or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains,
or agrees to cease or refrain, from handling, using, or transporting
any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing, or
refrain from doing, business with same. 1
Thus, the bill as introduced included the phrase "refrain from doing." In the
final print of the bill as passed by the Senate, this was deleted. 2 The omission
of a word in a parallel clause indicates that the word was consciously dropped
and that the clauses should be interpreted differently.3 It is unlikely, as the
Court indicates, that the word was dropped by mistake. These clauses were
fought over bitterly and each addition or deletion of a word was a battle in
itself. Also, this argument overlooks the fact that both sides were represented
by some of the best labor lawyers in the country"4 who would not be likely to
overlook such an omission. While legislative history is silent on the reason for
the omission, two possible reasons stand out. First, the activities of the Teamsters
concerned Congress in enacting this bill and are adequately covered. By a
broad reading of "products," most clauses would come within Section 8(e)..
The few remaining could have been thought by Congress not to have such a
substantial impact upon commerce as to warrant coverage. Second, unlike
the "cease" clause, a "refrain" clause does not disturb the status quo or work
any hardship on a neutral party since, at most, he loses only an expectancy of
business.
The final objection that the "cease doing business" clause was meant to
be a catchall ignores the fact that the "cease doing business" clause is broader
than the "handling products" clause in that (1) it includes all forms of service
30 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
ACT 1161 (1959).
31 2 LEGisLATivE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
AcT 1163 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
32 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
ACT 582 (1959).
33 See DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING § 6.2(d) (1954).
34 Included in this group were Archibald Cox, David Cole, Guy Farmer, Arthur Goldberg,
Charles Gregory, Denison Kitchel, Plato Papps, Gerald Reilley, Louis Sherman, Benjamin
Aaron, Russell Smith, George Taylor and Willard Wirtz. Many other lawyers advised indi-
vidual Senators.
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industries and (2) it includes nonstatutory employers, and possibly their own
employees. This dissimilarity in coverage would indicate that the clauses are
alternatives, rather than that one serves as a catchall for the other.
F. The Provisos: Not all clauses that come within the two proscriptive
clauses of Section 8(e) are prohibited. Two industries are specifically exempted
in whole or in part by this proviso to Section 8(e) :
Provided, That nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an
agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the
construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting
of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, paint-
ing, or repair of a building, structure, or other work: Provided
further, That for the purposes of this subsection (e) and section
8(b) (4) (B) the terms "any employer," ".any person engaged in
commerce or an industry affecting commerce," and "any person"
when used in relation to the terms "any other producer, processor,
or manufacturer," "any other employer," or "any other person"
shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer,
contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of
the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated
process of production in the apparel and clothing industry: Pro.
vided further, That nothing in this Act shall prohibit the enforce-
ment of any agreement which is within the foregoing exception.3 "
In the proviso, Congress specially excepted garment and construction in-
dustries. It could be, and has been, argued that this was an arbitrary classifica-
tion prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. It is well settled thAt Congress may
discriminate within a class if such a discrimination is reasonable. " Unlike other
industries, both excepted industries operate through subcontractors and are
thoroughly integrated."' Thus, this exception evidenced an awareness of an
economic pattern not present in other industries and cannot be said to be arbi-
trary or unreasonable.
Congress granted the garment industry an immunity from both Section
8(e) and Section 8(b) (4) (B). Because of this broad immunity, there have
been few problems and, consequently, little law has developed. On the other
hand, only a limited exception was granted the construction industry. To under-
stand the need for and the operation of this proviso, it is necessary to have a
knowledge of the construction industry. When construction begins, a skeleton
force is hired by the general contractor and his subcontractors. While the skele-
ton crew remains throughout the course of the project, employment for each
craft varies according to the stage of construction. Because of this, the work
force is sporadic and mobile. This militates against maintenance of more than
a skeleton force of permanent employees by the general contractor.
Historically, if the contractor heads a large concern, he draws craftsmen
as needed from their respective unions' exclusive hiring halls which consist of
pools of skilled employees. s This allows the contractor to have a ready source
35 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 704(b),
73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. V, 1964).
36 Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
37 Lunden, Subcontracting Clauses in Major Contracts, 84 MONTHrLY LABOR REv. 715
(1961).
38 See, e.g., Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 672 (1961).
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of manpower at a known price. The business agent can dispatch the necessary
craftsmen as needed, and when they are not needed, they return to the hall to
await their next call. For the union to maintain such a system, it must ensure
that all jobs within its jurisdiction are held by employees referred by them.
For the employee, jobs are of short duration. The craftsman must wander
from job to job and from employer to employer. Direct employment is rare
and he normally will be employed by a number of different contractors on
different projects during the course of a single season. The employee usually
belongs to the union, which acts as his referral agency for jobs to be performed
with his skills at a relatively uniform rate. Thus, the constant in a craftsman's
life is not the employer but the local which provides him employment oppor-
tunities. Thus, employees in this industry have been organized along craft
lines without regard to the project or to the particular employer involved and
it is the work performed that determines his collective-bargaining representative.
In .1959, Congress, recognizing that labor relations must be realistically ad-
ministered and appreciating the plight of craft unions in the building and con-
struction industry, approved exclusive hiring by enacting Section 8(f) of the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act."9
The construction industry is built up on the subcontracting of work which
is the rule and not the exception. It is uneconomical for a general contractor
to assemble and maintain the special equipment and specialized personnel needed
for a particular job. Typically, the general contractor bids on and secures an
overall project and then subcontracts for various specialties.4 The work which
the subcontractor performs is intimately connected with the work of a general
contractor, but the general contractor has overall responsibility for the project.
Because of this responsibility, it is standard practice for the general contractor
to require his subcontractors to agree to be bound by the terms of the prime
39 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griflin Act) § 705(a),
73 Stat. 545 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. V, 1964) reads in part:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsection (a), and (b)
of 5ection 8 for an employer primarily engaged in the building and con-
struction industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or
who, upon employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction
industry with a labor organization of which building and construction em-
ployees are members (not established, maintained, or assisted .. .) because
... (3) such agreement requires that the employer notify such labor organ-
ization of opportunities for employment with such employer or give such
labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for such
employment....
40 There are two types of contractors, the general contractor and the specialty contractor.
The general contractor may construct the entire project or he may subcontract to a specialty
contractor. The general contractor usually concentrates on a particular type of construction
in a particular size project. The specialty contractor specializes on a single trade or on two or
more related trades. The general contractor employs certain basic crafts such as carpenters,
laborers, operating engineers, cement masons, etc. The specialty contractor employs only a
certain specialty craft.
An exception to this division of general contractors and subcontractors is the large
general contractor who operates throughout the nation. This contractor has a national agree-
ment with the specialty crafts in which the unions agree to supply craftsmen directly to the
contractor. The contractor agrees to pay the prevailing wage in the area in which he has ajob, to recognize the judisdictional claims of the union, and to hire only members of the union.
This allows the general contractor to employ permanently an integrated supervisory force
accustomed to certain methods and policies and to hire only craftsmen and foremen who will
be supplied by the local of that union.
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contract, general conditions, and specifications in the master labor agreement
insofar as applicable to their work.41 Given this intimacy, unions in the con-
struction industry have handled the representation of the subcontractor's em-
ployees by including such workmen within the bargaining unit covered by the
contract with the general contractor. This has been done through a subcon-
tracting clause.
-4 2
Thus, in the construction industry, there is a great deal of vertical inte-
gration on the job site, with the work of one group of employees being imme-
diately passed on to the next through the extensive use of subcontracting. The
physical proximity between different groups of employees presents an oppor-
tunity for trouble if they cannot get along together. The purpose of the exemp-
tion was to prevent strife that might arise from union and nonunion people
working together on a job site.
In order for a construction clause to come within the exemption, it must
meet the exact terms of the proviso. Indeed, it has been suggested that a
clause will only be exempted if it contains the exact words of the statute.43 The
proviso, while exempting agreements which relate to construction work done on
the job site, does not give a specific formula to be used. There are several reasons
for not following an "exact language" approach. First, a mechanical per se
approach to labor relations has been rejected by both the courts and the Board
in dealing with lawfulness of labor contracts.44 Second, the Board in Paragon
Products Corp.45 and Stackhouse Oldsmobile" held that where a contract was
not unlawful on its face, it would be interpreted to require no more than what
is allowed by law and the clause need not reflect the precise language of the
statute. The Board has relied on NLRB v. News Syndicate Co." where the
Supreme Court approved a lower court holding that "in the absence of pro-
vision calling explicitly for illegal conduct, the contract cannot be illegal because
it fails to affirmatively disclaim all illegal objects." Third, if a clause is ambigu-
ous, the Board in a Section 8(e) proceeding will not presume unlawfulness
absent substantially evidence,4" but will consider extrinsic evidence to determine
whether the clause was lawfully administered."9 The Board will consider the
language used, the intent of the party, and the coverage of the clause. Finally,
the Board in other cases has upheld the legality of clauses which do not contain
the specific language of the statute, even though it did not specifically discuss
41 PARKER & ADAMS, THE AIA STANDARD CONTRACT FoRM AND THE LAW 52 (1954).
42 See generally, Note, The Nature of the Construction Industry, 60 YALE L.J. 673
(1951). In the construction industry, subcontracting is generally accepted by the union and
the employers as a normal condition of work. Few provisions are found that attempt to pre-
serve job opportunities by limiting subcontracting. Lunden, Subcontracting Clauses in Major
Contracts, 84 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 715 (1961).
43 International Bhd. of Elec. Workers (the Ets-Hokin Corp. case), Case No. 28-CE-3
(1964) (Trial Examiner's decision).
44 See, e.g., Paragon Products Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 662 (1961).
45 Id. at 666.
46 140 N.L.R.B. 1239, 1241 (1963).
47 365 U.S. 695 (1961).
48 Milk Drivers Union (the Minnesota Milk Co. case), 133 N.L.R.B. 1314 (1961).
49 Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (the Cardinal Industries case), 136 N.L.R.B.
977, 986 (1962).
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this problem." Some things which the Board might look to in arriving at the
nature of the clause are (1) the type of work the union has performed in the
past, (2) the work description found in the present contract, (3) the type of
work the employer is now engaged in, and (4) the intent of the parties.
While the construction clause probably does not have to include the pro-
viso, it still must satisfy the statute. The first requirement is that the employer
be in the construction industry. In Falstaff Brewing Corp.,"' the Board held
that an employer who runs a brewery was not one in the construction industry.
This result was reached in the Kroger case involving the operator of a chain
of retail stores.52 How far the Board is willing to go in this direction is uncer-
tain. Since in the Kroger case the operator of the retail store did not contract
directly with the building contractor, but only leased the property from a realtor
who did the actual contracting, the issue of whether a contractor who has no
employees of his own is an employer in the construction industry remains to
be met.53 However, since the proviso applies not only to the subcontracting
of work but also to the contracting of work, it would seem that a contracting
employer could contract out the work and still come within the protection of
the statute even though he has no employees of his own.
The most troublesome requirement to date has been that the work be
done at the job site. The Board maintains that a contract dealing with work
that is not to be performed at the construction site is not within the protection
of the proviso." The fact that the work could be done at the construction site
is irrelevant for purposes of the construction proviso.55 This is in conformity
with the purpose of the statute which is to prevent on-site trouble among
groups of employees. There are two types of clauses which might be of con-
cern to the Board under this section: a transportation clause and a picket line
clause. The validity of the transportation clause should depend on where the
transportation occurs. If it occurs at the site alone, it should come within the
purpose of the clause; if it occurs almost completely off the site, it should be
invalid; and if the transportation occurs substantially both on and off the
site, then it should be invalid only to the extent to which it applies away from
the job site.56 A picket line clause is one which grants immunity to individual
employees who refuse to cross a picket line of another employer. If the employees
50 International Union of Operating Eng'rs (the Schedell Contractor case), 145 N.L.R.B.
351 (1963); Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs (the Nichols Elec. Co. case), 138
N.L.R.B. 540 (1962).
51 Local 585, Bhd. of Painters (the Falstaff Brewing Corp. case), 144 N.L.R.B. 100 (1963).
52 Columbus Bldg. Council (the Kroger Co. case), 1964 CCH LAB. L. REP. 13605
(Nov. 30, 1964).
53 See Carl Leipzeig (the General Motors Corp. case), 1964 CCH LAB. L. RPp. 113564
(Nov. 17, 1964).
54 Cement Masons' Union (the Interstate Employers case), 1964 CCH LAB. L. REP.
13597 (Nov. 30, 1964).
55 Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (the Cardinal Industries case), 136 N.L.R.B. 977
(1962). However, this fact would be important in determining whether the scope of a work
preservation clause in the construction industry is primary and excluded from the general pro-
hibition of Section 8(e).
56 In Cement Masons' Union (the Interstate Employers case), 1964 CCH LAB. L. laP. 1
13597 (Nov. 30, 1964), the Board held a broad transportation clause invalid without making
this distinction.
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who refuse to cross the picket line are not themselves engaged in construction
work on the job site, the construction proviso does not apply to them," but if
they are engaged in construction work along with those on the picket line,
then it would seem permissible so long as the purpose of the picket line relates
to the contracting or subcontracting of work. Since an agreement covering
primary picket lines is exempt from Section 8(e),' the only protection that
could be accorded a union would arise in cases involving a secondary picket
line. However, in such a case the Board might find that the picket line is too
remotely connected to contracting or subcontracting of work to afford protection.
Even if the clause does come within the proviso, the union might run
into problems in obtaining or enforcing it. Section 8(b) (4) (A) prohibits the
means for "forcing or requiring any employer.., to enter into any agreement
which is prohibited by subsection (e) of this Section." The Board originally
took the position that a construction proviso clause was unlawful under 8(b)
(4) (A)." The Board's approach was subsequently rejected by several Courts
of Appeals 0 on the theory that the proviso to Section 8(e) is incorporated by
reference into 8(b) (4) (A) and hence an attempt to obtain such a clause falls
outside Section 8(b) (4) (A). In Gentlivre Village Apartments"1 the Board
re-examined its approach and decided to defer to the Court's interpretation.
It is still possible for the Board to find a violation if the contract contains other
clauses that would be illegal under Section 8(e) and not exempted by the
proviso thereto.
Even if coercion to obtain such a clause is not illegal under Section 8(b)
(4) (A), there is no doubt that coercion to enforce such a clause would be a
violation of Section 8(b) (4) (B), which reads:
Sec. 8 ....
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents- ...
(4) ....(ii) to threaten, coerce or restrain any person engaged
in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce,
where in either case an object thereof is ...
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease
using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to
cease doing business with any other per-
son.
Coercion to enforce an executed contract proviso clause would cause a cession
of a business relation under Section 8(b) (4) (B). The Section 8(e) proviso
would not be of aid since it only authorizes entering into. This result is but-
tressed by the wording of the statute itself which specifically indicates that only
57 Cf. Teamsters Union (the Connecticut Sand & Stone case), 138 N.L.P.B. 532 (1962).
58 Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
59 Construction Union (the Colson & Stevens case), 137 N.L.R.B. 1650 (1962).
60 See, e.g., Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.
1964).
61 Northeastern Indiana Bldg. Council (the Centlivre Village Apartments case), 1964 CCH
LAB. L. REP. 13386 (Sept. 4, 1964).
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the garment industry" is exempted from Section 8(b) (4) (B). The legislative
history is clear that coercion to enforce such a clause would be a violation of
the Act.
In Centlivre Village Apartments,"8 the Board had -occasion to re-examine
its Section 8(b) (4) (B) position set forth in Colson and Stevens.s The Board
found that, on the facts of that case, respondents' picketing violated Section
8(b) (4) (i) (ii) (B) in that it had as one of its objects forcing or requiring
Centlivre, the general contractor, to cease doing business with K & K, a car-
pentry subcontractor which had no agreement with the respondent council
or its affiliated craft locals:
We are persuaded that picketing by a union in the construction
industry to interrupt business relations between a neutral general
contractor and an identified subcontractor constitutes a violation
of Section 8(b) (4) (B) notwithstanding the fact that the picketing
also has a lawful concurrent objective of securing a "hot cargo"
agreement permitted by the proviso 8(e).
The court decisions in which we have acquiesced above state, and
we agree, that under Section 8(b) (4) (B) lawful "hot cargo" clauses
"may be enforced only through lawsuits, and not through economic
action." If Respondents had had such a clause with Centlivre and
pursuant thereto had, by picketing, sought to have Centlivre cease
doing business with K & K, the picketing would have violated
8(b) (4) (B). No different result is called for because Respondents
by their picketing seek simultaneously to obtain a lawful "hot cargo"
clause and termination of business relations with a primary em-
ployer, K & K, rather than first the contract and then the termina-
tion. It is immaterial that one of the objects of the picketing was
lawful, if another object was unlawful. "It is not necessary to find
that the sole object of the strike was that of forcing the contractor
to terminate the subcontractor's contract."6 5
While a union may not engage in unlawful action to enforce a construc-
tion proviso contract,"6 the question is what conduct comes within the pro-
hibition of the Act. In the Sand Door case,6 7 Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared:
It does not necessarily follow from the fact that the unions cannot
invoke the contractual provision in the manner in which they sought
to do so in the present cases that it may not, in some totally different
context not now before the Court, still have legal radiations affect-
ing the relations between the parties. All we need now say is that
the contract cannot be enforced by the meansspecifically prohibited
in § 8(b) (4) (A) [8(b) (4) (B)].8
62 The difference in treatment is not explained in the statute, legislative history or the
nature of the industry. This raises the question whether this is an unconstitutional classifica-
tion. Since both industries are unique, it is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court will
upset Congress' determination as to how they will be treated.
63 Northeastern Indiana Bldg. Council (the Centlivre Village Apartments case), 1964 CCH
LAB. L. RE'. 13386 (Sept. 4, 1964).
64 137 N.LY.B. 1650 (1962).
65 Northeastern Indiana Bldg. Council (the Centlivre Village Apartments case), 1964 CCH
LAB. L. REP. 13386 at 21415 (Sept. 4, 1964). The Board cited NLRB v. Denver Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1951).
66 Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB (the Sand Door Co. case), 357 U.S.
93, 104-05 (1958).
67 Ibid.
68 Id. at 108. (Emphasis added.)
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Thus, the Court indicated that the ultimate objective of the union was lawful
adherence by the employer to the contractual provision. The only question
left open to the Board was whether the particular method utilized was unlawful,
but only means precisely proscribed can be considered by the Board. The
parties are still free to resort to statutory and contractual remedies to bring
pressure on the employer to conform to his legal obligation.
Section 8(b) (4) (B) allows an employer voluntarily to observe a con-
struction proviso clause. The employer may in good conscience feel bound
by an agreement freely entered into. The employer also may be in sympathy
with a union objective such as the elimination of substandard working con-
ditions which allow other employers more effectively to compete due to lower
labor costs. He may even comply with the union's request in the hope that it
will result in concessions from the union at the next bargaining session. These
are all legitimate reasons which the employer may consider in running his
business. The union may urge that these factors be weighed by the employer
in making his decision so long as it does not use prohibited pressure and the
employer may respond favorably to such pressure without violating the Act. 9
Of course, the Board must decide whether the choice was entirely voluntary
or was the result of some hidden coercion.
The union also may bring a lawsuit judicially to enforce its contract. The
courts have held that such action does not constitute coercion for the purpose
of Section 8(b) (4) (B) and will grant the union traditional remedies, such as
specific performance, in order to obtain compliance by the employer."' The
next question, therefore, is whether the parties may provide a contractual
remedy which obviates the need for court enforcement.
Most contracts provide some form of grievance and arbitration procedure
by which the employer may take the issue of his alleged violation of the con-
struction proviso clause to an arbitrator. It is fairly clear that arbitrators have
the right to review the issue of legality of the contract's terms,7 even though
the subject of the dispute might also be an unfair labor practice under Section
8(b) (4)."M The Board, in United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,"' deferred to
the interpretation given the contract clause by the arbitrator and found that
the clause was not violative of Section 8(e)." In Spielberg Manufacturing
Company 5 the Board stated that it would accept an arbitrator's award if (1)
the arbitration proceeding was fair and regular, (2) all parties had agreed
to be bound, and (3) the decision of the arbitration panel was not clearly
repugnant to the purposes of the Act." Only the last Spielberg requirement
would be in issue here. The Board has not clarified what is meant by this, but
69 United Slate Roofers Union (the Atlas Roofing Go. case), 134 N.L.R.B. 367 (1961).
70 Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp., 322 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1964).
71 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
72 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) (involving Section
8(b)(4)(B)).
73 Service Union (the United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. case), 1964 CCH LAB. L. REP.
13418 (Sept. 14, 1964).
74 Id. at 21500.
75 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
76 Id. at 1082.
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a study of the cases indicates that the arbitrator's determination, of both fact
and law will stand unless it is expressly covered by statute. If this is so, then
we must ask whether enforcement of such a clause is expressly prohibited by
the law. In view of the fact that a court will enforce this type of clause,"7
specific enforcement by an arbitrator should not be considered illicit coercion
by the Board and should be honored.
Accordingly, then, it might be argued that other forms of contractual
enforcement should be honored. Such a contract clause providing for self-
enforcement is a termination clause which gives the union, in addition to other
rights and remedies, the right to terminate or rescind the contract upon its
breach. As noted by the Board in Amalgamated Lithographers, Local 78 (the
Miami Post case)b" the "right to terminate" clause is intended to give the union
a remedy for breach of another clause, and its validity will depend on the
validity of the other clause. Since the construction proviso clause is lawful, a
clause which is intended to implement it is lawful also." If the clauses can-
not be actually implemented, their validity standing alone is meaningless. Since
rescission is a normal contractual remedy and constitutes no greater form of
coercion than specific performance, it cannot be said that the union has used
unlawful means prohibited by Section 8(b) (4) (B).
The problem of enforcement of subcontracting clauses is also reflected
in other sections of the Act. In Northern California Chapter, Associated Gen-
eral Contractors"° the Board held that the enforcement of a union signatory
clause (which required that the terms and conditions of the prime contract be
applied to all subcontractors) to disrupt an existing relationship by forcing the
cancellation of a contract between the general contractor and a subcontractor,
even though entered into in violation of such clause, was a violation of Section
8(a) (1), (2) and (3) by the employer as to the employees of the subcontractor
who were deprived of their work because of the cancellation, and Section
8(b) (1) (A) and (2) by the union, but that the enforcement of such a clause
to prevent entering into such a relationship was not a violation of the above
sections of the Act. The first and only case after the passage of Section 8(e)
to deal with this problem was Burt Mfg. Co.' The Board held that the union,
by attempting to cause a manufacturer of sheet metal used on construction
job sites to sign a union security agreement even though his employees were
not represented by it, violated Section 8(b) (2) and the fact that it might also
have been seeking to enforce a "union-only" subcontracting clause was no
defense. It should be noted that the type of clause being enforced falls within
the general proscription of Section 8(e). In the Burt Mfg. case, the Board
considered the construction proviso to Section 8(e) but held that it was in-
applicable since the work in question did not occur at the job site. The Board
did not discuss what effect a holding that a clause was within the proviso
77 Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1964).
78 130 N.L.R.B. 968 (1961).
79 Id. at 977.
80 The St. Maurice, Helmkamp & Musser case, 119 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1958), enfd, 266
F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 839 (1959).
81 Sheet Metal Workers Assn (the Burt Mfg. Co. case), 127 N.L.R.B. 1629 (1960), end
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would have but the tone of the decision indicated that it would result in a
dismissal of the charge, which would be supported by the fact that such a
clause is enforceable in spite of Section 8(b) (4) (B). 82
Even if a clause is not within the protection of Section 8(b) (4) (B) or
8(e), if the alleged discrimination is caused by a jurisdictional dispute, the
Board will not consider the alleged discrimination until it has settled the juris-
dictional dispute.83 But if the union is not seeking only the work, but is in
fact trying to organize the employees of the subcontractor by putting pressure
on the general contractor, then it will violate Section 8(b) (1) (A) and Section
8(b) (2) if it succeeds," and the conduct itself might violate Sections 8(b)
(4) (C) and 8(b) (7) of the Act. Hence, if a dispute involves a work assign-
ment and is not exempted from the general proscription of Section 8(e) by
reason of either the nature of the clause or the construction proviso, and if a
Section 10(k) hearing has been held, only then may the Board proceed to the
underlying reasons enunciated in the Associated General Contractors case.
Section 8(a) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer, by
discrimination in regard to any term or condition of employment, to encourage
or discourage membership in a labor organization. In order to show discrimina-
tion, two elements must be present: (1) employer and employees, and (2)
discrimination. In the Associated General Contractors case, there was a three-
way split with no view commanding a majority as to the first element. While
all seemed to agree that an employment relationship exists when a person has
the power to effectuate the terms and conditions of employment in question,
they disagreed as to what constituted control. The three member majority
found that a general contractor had sufficient control over the subcontractor's
employees solely because of this relationship since by terminating the contract
the general contractor effectively terminates the employment of the employees
of the subcontractor. The two-member dissent rejected this approach and held
that (1) there had to be actual control over the terms and conditions of em-
ployment 5 and not just the power to terminate; and (2) since the union had
the right to enter into a contract boycotting nonunion contractors, it should
have the right to enforce their agreement, not only before the relationship is
entered into, but after a relationship is entered into in violation of the contract
and without the union's consent.86
The dissent presents the more defensible position. As noted by Mechem,
an employee remains presumptively in the service of his general employer, the
subcontractor, unless it can be affirmatively shown that in fact his allegiance
in part, 293 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 896 (1961).
82 Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1964).
83 Local 502, Int'l Hod Carriers Union (the Cement Work Corp. case), 140 N.L.R.B.
694 (1963).
84 See ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1962); Operative Plasterers' Ass'n (the Arnold
M. Hansen case), 1964 CCH LAB. L. REP. 13607 (Nov. 30, 1964).
85 See Moore Drop Forging Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 165 (1963) and Hurd Corp., 143 N.L.R.B.
306 (1963) where there was actual participation by the general contractor in the discrimi-
nation.
. 86 In Local 911, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (the Wand Corp. case), 122 N.L.R.B. 499, 502-
03 (1958), Member Fanning, in his dissent, felt that point 2 was buttressed by the United
States Supreme Court's holding in the Sand Door case, 357 U.S. 93 (1958). - "
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has been transferred to the special employer, the general contractor.' Such
a transfer of allegiance exists where the special employer, the general contractor,
may in practice or by terms of the agreement or both actually exercise control
over the servant as to make him seem the real master. Power to terminate
the contract alone would not be the type of control thought sufficient to change
this relationship. Since the contract can be lawfully entered into, it can be
lawfully enforced." and can lawfully bring about cancellation of the relation-
ship and subsequent termination of employment of the subcontractor's employees
on the project. The fact that the parties might use means illegal under Section
8(b) (4) (B) should have no bearing on their seeking a lawful object under
Sections 8(b) (2) or 8(a) (3).
II. Clauses Not Within the Purpose of Section 8(e)
The plain meaning of the language is that all clauses except those exempt
by the provisos fall within the scope of its language and are prohibited by
Section 8(e). Therefore, if this section is read literally, it could cover all sub-
contracting clauses not exempt by the provisos. Did Congress intend such a
result? One Congressman thought it did.8" However, as noted by the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers:9"
[W]e have often cautioned against the danger, when interpreting
a statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents.
In their zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to over-
state its reach. "The fears and doubts of the opposition are no
authoritative guides to the construction of legislation. It is the
sponsors that we look to when the meaning of statutory words is
in doubt." . . . The silence of the sponsors of amendments is preg-
nant with significance .... 91
Since Congress did not discuss the types of clauses to be allowed and the rea-
sons for their allowance, legislative history, so far as direct reference is con-
cerned, is of little value. However, what types of subcontracting clauses are
to be exempted from Section 8(e) can be ascertained indirectly from what
prompted Congress to enact this section. Both its wording and legislative his-
tory indicate that the main concern of Congress was to close the "Sand Door"
loophole to Section 8(b) (4) (B) which was thought to allow a union and
employer to agree in a contract to do what Section 8(b) (4) (B) prohibited a
union from forcing an employer to do absent an agreement.9" Congress intended
the new section to be interpreted in harmony with the developed law under
Section 8(b) (4) (B)." This is strengthened by the fact that both sections, by
utilizing almost identical language, proscribe the same object.
87 MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 466 (4th ed. 1952).
88 See Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1964).
89 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
ACT 1428, 1430 (1959).
90 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
91 Id. at 66 (referring to Senators Morse and Humphrey as the "opposition," and Sen-
ators Goldwater and Dirksen as the "sponsors").
92 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
ACT 778-79 (1959).
93 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
ACT 1575-76 (1959).
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Section 8(b) (4) (B) was designed to prevent the unnecessary extension
of disputes with an employer by confining the dispute to him and by limiting
the amount of pressure a union may exert against a neutral employer because
of his business relationship with the employer against whom the union has the
dispute. Thus, this section is designed to accommodate the right of a union
effectively to bring pressure on a primary employer with the right of a sec-
ondary employer to operate free from pressure directed at it to cease doing
business with the primary employer. This section was not designed to shield
secondary employers from all the adverse radiations flowing from a primary
dispute. Normally, the secondary employer will be adversely affected if a wholly
or partially successful strike occurs at the primary's plant since its business will
be disrupted.9
This primary-secondary dichotomy is reflected in the language of Section
8(e) which is cast in terms of "any other employer" and "any other person"
demonstrating that Congress intended to place only contract clauses relating
to secondary employers under its prohibition. The test of whether a clause
is primary or secondary is similar to the test of whether a subject of bargaining
is mandatory: the subject matter must settle a term or condition of employ-
ment of the employer's employees.95 Under such a test a clause would be
primary if directly aimed at the terms and conditions of employment of the
employees in the unit and would be secondary if directly aimed at the terms
and conditions of employment of employees outside the bargaining unit.9 If
a primary subcontracting clause causes a cessation of business, such effect is
secondary. But so long as a clause is substantially free of secondary charac-
teristics, it will be outside the proscription of Section 8(e).
In general, the Board has adopted the above approach. It has held that
Section 8(e) does not bar all subcontracting agreements9 and that Sections
8(e) and 8(b) (4) (B) must be construed in harmony.9" In applying the above
principles, the Board has proceeded on a case-by-case approach, examining the
language used, the intent of the parties, and the scope of the restriction em-
bodied in the clause.99 If the words of the clause in question match the lan-
guage in the statute, the clause must fall within the proscription of Section
8(e) and how the clause is enforced by the parties is irrelevant.' 0 However,
it should be noted that most clauses are not this clear so that the Board is
forced to take extensive evidence to determine whether the object of the clause
is directed at the employment conditions of the employees in the bargaining
unit. In such circumstances the Board will look to (1) the scope of the bar-
94 Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (the New Power Wire Corp. case), 144 N.L.R.B.
1089 (1963).
95 Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors, 143 N.L.R.B. 409 (1963).
96 Operative Plasterers' Ass'n (the Arnold M. Hansen case), 1964 CCH LAE. L. REP.
13607 (Nov. 30, 1964); So. Cal. Dist. Council of Hod Carriers (the Golding and Jones, Inc.
case), 144 N.L.R.B. 978 (1963).
97 Milk Drivers Union (the Minnesota Milk Co. case), 133 N.L.R.B. 1314, 1316 (1961);
Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (the Cardinal Industries case), 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 984-
86 (1962).
98 See text accompanying notes 27-34 supra.........
99 Milk Drivers Union (the Minnesota Milk Co. case), 133 N.L.R.B. 1314, 1317 (1961).
100 Truck Drivers Union (the Patton Warehouse case), 140 N.L.R.B. 1474 (1963), enfd,
334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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gaining unit; (2) the object of the clause; (3) the extent to which the union
also represents employees outside the bargaining unit covered by the contract;
(4) the extent to which any person, firm, or corporation whose employees are
not represented by the union which is in competition with unit members of
the union observes and causes its employees to observe substantially the same
conditions of employment as those observed by the employer; (5) the extent
to which both parties, in agreeing to the clause, understood and acquiesced
in a secondary object; and (6) the extent to which secondary consequences
within Section 8(e)'s intendment would probably flow from the provision, in
view of the economic history, the circumstances of the industry, the locality,
and the parties. 1 '
If, after the above analysis, the Board still considers the clause ambiguous
and susceptible to various interpretations, it will find the clause unlawful only
to the extent to which it can be interpreted unlawfully."0 2 In order to prevent
the parties'from creating ambiguities wheie they do not exist merely to avoid
the impact of the Act, the Board is careful that there is ambiguity both in the
language of the clause and the intent of parties. The Board will accept the
interpretation of an arbitrator as to the meaning of the clause.0 3
If a clause is valid on its face, it can still be interpreted to be illegal. How-
ever, if the parties, intentionally or mistakenly, interpret a valid clause so as
to encompass an illegal secondary object, then this interpretation, but not the
valid clause, will be held to constitute an illegal clause under 8(e). 104
III. Specific Types of Clauses
A. Introduction
More than 75 per cent of the major contracts in America contain no
direct reference to subcontracting.' 5 Despite this absence, there are implied
restrictions on subcontracting. In Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB, 08
the Supreme Court held that an employer must bargain about subcontracting. 7
However, this does not alleviate, in any real sense, the union's concern for
job security since once the employer has discussed his intention in good faith
with the union to an impasse, it may proceed to subcontract.
Because of this inadequacy, unions have sought relief by bargaining for
no-subcontracting clauses in their contracts. The Board has held that a clause
which forbids all subcontracting is legal as a legitimate device to protect the
economic integrity of the bargaining unit. 08 Since an absolute ban on sub-
contracting is seldom seen in collective bargaining contracts, it has had little
101 Carnation Co., case No. 21-CE-33 (1964) (Order re-opening the record).
102 Truck Drivers Union (the Freeto Constr. Co. case), 1964 CCH LAB. L. Rp. 13491
(Oct. 20, 1964).
103 Service Employees' Union (the United Artists Theatre Circuit case), 1964 CCH LAn.
L. REP. 13418 (Sept. 14, 1964).
104 Milk Drivers Union (the Sidney Wanzer case), 141 N.L.R.B. 1237, 1242 (1963).
105 Lunden, supra note 37, at 581-82.
106 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
107 Id. at 215.
108 Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (the Cardinal Industries case), 136 N.L.R.B. 977
(1962). Service Employees' Union (the United Artists Theatre Circuit case), 1964 CCH
LAB. L. REP. 1 13418 (Sept. 14, 1964).
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impact on labor relations." 9 The reason behind the infrequency of such clauses
is that they would be valuable in only a limited number of situations. It would
not be practical where an industry is integrated, or where the volume of business
fluctuates.- In such circumstances, it would be financially impossible for the
employer not to subcontract.
Many subcontracting clauses allow subcontracting in cases of emergency
and where the employer does not have the equipment or the manpower to
perform a given job."' There is no problem as to the emergency exception
since a one-time subcontract of a limited duration is unlikely to have substantial
impact on the bargaining unit. The reason behind allowing the employer to
subcontract where there is a shortage of equipment or manpower is that it
does not force the employer to acquire new facilities which will not be used
most of the time or to hire additional employees who will be laid off in a few
days.
Beyond this point, the unions' attitudes stiffen and a number of contract
clauses..' bar subcontracting either when employees are on layoff or part-time
work or when subcontracting would cause layoffs in part-time work. The same
result can be achieved indirectly by allowing the employer to subcontract under
certain circumstances but providing that an amount equal to that paid the
subcontractor will be paid to the employees on layoff or part-time who other-
wise would have performed the work. Such a clause acts as a combined work
preservation clause and a guaranteed wage.
Examples of the type of clause forbidden by Section 8(e) are the "union
only" and the "union preference" clauses. In the "union only" clause, the
contracting employer is allowed to subcontract to any union employer or an
employer having a contract with a specific type of union. If the clause allows
subcontracting out work which could be done by the unit employees, then
the removal of such work provides no benefit to them and is clearly secondary.
If the work could not be done by the employer except at additional expense,
the removal is not of direct benefit to the contracting unit, but rather contributes
to the unionization of employees generally which might indirectly benefit the
employees in the unit." 2 As for clauses requiring the employer to give "pref-
erence" to union firms, the court in District 9, 1AM v. NLRB.. held that such
a clause is illegal because, where both union and non-union firms are available,
it forces an employer to cease doing business with non-union employers and
hense is unlawful for the reasons given above." 4 In order to circumvent these
holdings, unions have attempted to secure clauses which provide that there will
be no subcontracting at all without prior union approval. It is likely that such
109 Lunden, supra note 37, at 581.
110 Id. at 579-80.
111 Id. at 579.
112 In Joint Council of Teamsters (the Arden Farms case), 141 N.L.R.B. 341 (1963), the
reverse situation occurred and the Board held invalid a clause which would have actually pro-
hibited all subcontracting except to specified nonunion contractors because it represented an
agreement whereby an employer agrees to cease doing business with another.
113 315 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
114 Id. at 36-37.
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a clause would be bad because it bears only a tenuous relation to the protection
of the employees in the bargaining unit and is too susceptible to abuse.
B. Work Preservation Clauses
In Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB,115 the Supreme Court held that
contracting-out of work being performed by employees in an existing bargain-
ing unit is a mandatory subject of bargaining.1 ' The aim bf work preservation
clauses is to regulate working conditions within the plant of the contracting
employer by maintaining jobs for the employees in the bargaining unit. This
type of clause protects the legitimate self-interest of the employees by tending
to stabilize the work distribution and by protecting and preserving the status
quo, thus eliminating unemployment and readjustment for these employees.
The object of allowing unit employees to do traditional work is primary activity
and any adverse effects on neutral employers are purely incidental. Since the
union has no dispute with the secondary or neutral employers, the purpose of
the clause cannot be to harm such secondary employer because his labor policies.
are objectionable, or to force him to change his labor policies. Also, since the
contracting employer is already doing the work, the secondary employer is not
deprived of work he has done in the past, but is merely denied an opportunity
to acquire new work.
In Meat and Highway Drivers Local 710 v. NLRB," 7 the Court of
Appeals went one step further and held that if jobs are "fairly claimable" by
the unit, they may be protected by a "no-subcontracting" clause even though
the unit is not performing the work at this time.' This is commonly known
as a work assignment clause. Such a clause prohibits the subcontracting of work
where the unit employees are capable of performing and have in the past per-
formed such work or, if new work is involved, it is related to their present or
past work. The primary purpose of such a clause is to provide the additional
protection incidental to doing more work.
The Board has held that activity to require the employer to observe the
work-assignment provisions of a contract is primary activity exempt from Sec-
tion 8(b) (4) (B). 9 Obviously, the clause itself must be a primary clause
exempt from Section 8(e) and the Board has so held. In Cardinal Industries,
Inc.," ' the Board adopted the following statement of a Trial Examiner:
Whethek defined in terms of "contract coverage" or "appropriate
unit" or "union work jurisdiction," the delineation and exclusive
assignment to employees in a contract unit of specified work tasks
cannot itself be regarded as unlawful.... In Section 10(k) cases,
the Board has long upheld as valid the preemption by contract of
115 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
116 Id. at 209-15.
117 335 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
118 Id. at 713.
119 International Longshoremen's Union (the Pacific Maritime Assn case), 137 N.L.R.B.
119 (1962).
120 Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (the Cardinal Industries case), 136 N.L.R.B. 977(1962).
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assigned work jurisdiction to members of a particular craft, and
has ruled strike action to enforce such contractually granted work
jurisdictional rights not violative of Section 8(b) (4) (D) .121
The cite to Section 8(b) (4) (D) is most apt. In NLRB v. Radio and Television
Broadcast Engineers Union,'22 the Supreme Court held that the Board could,
under Section 10(k), make an assignment to a union of work which was assigned
and being done by another group of employees. 22 Since that case, the Board
has assigned work contrary to the employer's assignment' 2. and has considered
a contract clause as a factor in deciding the dispute where such a clause is
unambiguous. 2 ' Thus, under Section 8(b)(4)(D) and(B), a union can
use primary methods to force a employer to take work away from one group
of employees and assign it to another if this is done pursuant to a lawful work-
clause.
In view of the above, it is not surprising that the Board, in Charles B.
Mahin,' has held a work-assignment clause to be exempt from the prohibition
of Section 8(e). However, such a clause can be used only to acquire work
which is normally related to the past or present work of the employees. In
determining what work can be acquired by such a clause, the Board might wish
to use some of the criteria employed in a Section 10(k) assignment hearing,
that is, (1) whether employees have performed the work in the past, (2)
whether this work is substituted for work they have performed in the past, (3)
whether other employees doing similar work in the area or industry have
done this type of work, and (4) whether the employees in the bargaining unit
possess the skills to do this type of work safely and efficiently.
If a work-assignment clause is valid, the fact that the union attempts to
interpret the clause in an illegal manner has no bearing on the clause itself, 27
but coercion to obtain an illegal object will constitute a violation of Section
8(b) (4) (B). If the Board has already awarded the work in question to another
union in a Section 10(k) hearing, no real claim can exist and the union coerces
a contrary assignment. However, if the Section 10(k) award resolves a border-
line situation after the dispute giving rise to a Section 8(b) (4) (B) complaint,
such complaint will be dismissed. 28 If the employer does not have control
over the assignment of the work, then an attempt to coerce him to change the
assignment is in fact pressure levied against him as a secondary with the inten-
tion that this will coerce the primary. Such conduct is the .typical activity
121 Id. at 985-86.
122 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
123 The Court affirmed the Appellate Court's refusal to enforce the Board's order.
124 E.g., Local 68, Wood Lathers Union (the Acoustics & Specialties, Inc. case), 142
N.L.R.B. 1073 (1963); Local 499, IBEW (the Iowa Power and Light Co. case), 144 N.L.R.B.
870 (1963).
125 Local 585, Bhd. of Painters (the Bishopric Products Co. case), 140 N.L.R.B. 1304
(1963).
126 Metropolitan Dist. Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters (the Charles B. Mahin case),
1964 CCH LAB. L. REP. 13555 (Nov. 12, 1964).
127 See text accompanying note 104 supra.
128 New York Paper Cutters' Union (the Automatic Sealing Service, Inc. case), 1964 CCH
LAB. L. REP. 13454 (Sept. 25, 1964).
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proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) (B).' 29 The theory behind this is that if the
employer, in good faith, seeks the work for his men but cannot obtain it, he
should not be penalized for accepting the work since the fact that he does
accept the work will not result in any benefit to the unit members. On the
other hand, if the employer does not honestly seek the work for his men but
lets it go by default, the Board should dismiss the employer's complaint for lack
of clean hands.'
There are two other types of work preservation clauses which have received
special attention by the Board: (1) prefabrication clauses and (2) multi-
employer unit-work clauses. The prefabrication clause is simply a work-
assignment clause in the construction industry. Such clauses have been in
existence for many years, but due to the increase in recent years in the manu-
facturing and assembling of construction parts away from the construction site,
a growing importance has been attached to them. So long as the union seeks
to restrict the use of prefabricated materials by demanding that the work be
done by it, its purpose is primary and will not come within the general pro-
scription of Section 8(e).' If the clause goes beyond this and allows sub-
contracting to a union firm off the site, it will be prohibited by Section 8(e)3 2
and is not exempted by the proviso.'3
The ordinary work preservation clause is between one employer and one
union. The question arises as to whether a work preservation clause may be
between a union and a multi-employer unit. In the Bituminous Coal Operators
case,3 4 the Board felt that a work preservation clause limiting work to employees
in an appropriate multi-employer bargaining unit would be valid.3 5 The chief
point to note is that there must be an appropriate bargaining unit. The normal
rule for establishing a multi-employer bargaining unit is that the participation
of a group of employees, whether members or non-members of an association,
either personally or through a representative, in joint bargaining session un-
equivocally manifest an intent to be bound by a group rather than individual
action." If the union allows subcontracting to outside employers on the basis
of union considerations, the clause would be bad.s" What if the union allows
subcontracting of work to employers who are willing to become a party to the
contract? There is court support for the contention that such a clause is illegal
because it is being used to require firms to sign union contracts.' If each
firm has a fixed permanent employee complement, the addition of another
129 Metropolitan Dist. Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters (the Charles B. Mahin case),
1964 CCH LAB. L. REP. 13555 (Nov. 12, 1964); United Ass'n of Journeymen and Appren-
tices of the Plumbing Industry (the Arthur Venneri case), 137 N.L.R.B. 828 (1962), en.'d,
321 F.2d 366, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963).
130 In addition to the above, a union may not use secondary methods to enforce a clause.
See note 129 supra.
131 Metropolitan Dist. Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters (the Charles B. Mahin case),
1964 CCH LAn. L. REP. 1 13555 at 21,810-11 (Nov. 12, 1964).
132 See text accompanying notes 112-13 supra.
133 See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
134 Raymond 0. Lewis (the Bituminous Coal Operators case), 144 N.L.R.B. 228 (1963).
135 Id. at 236-37.
136 Morgan Linen Serv., Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 420 (1961).
137 Raymond 0. Lewis (the Bituminous Coal Operators case), 144 N.L.R.B. 228 (1963).
138 NLRB v. Joint Council of Teamsters, 338 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1964).
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employer does not improve the employment condition of employees in the unit.
However, if each employer has only a transient work force drawn from a pool
of labor, the addition of other employers doing the same work would improve
the working conditions of those in the labor pool..9 and maximize their job
opportunities.
C. Work Standard Clauses
The United States Supreme Court, in Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Oliver,' held that conditions imposed on contracting-out to prevent possible
curtailment of jobs and the undermining of conditions of employment for mem-
bers of the bargaining unit constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining. 4' In
Meat and Highway Drivers Union v. NLRB, 4 ' the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia inferred that a clause which restricted subcon-
tracting to "any cartage company whose truckdrivers enjoy the same or greater
wages and other benefits as provided in this agreement" may be lawful because
such clause was a legitimate attempt by the union to protect and preserve the
work and standards it had bargained for by removing the economic incentive
for subcontracting thus preserving the work for the unit employees.'
The prime purpose for the existence of the labor movement has been to
better the working conditions of the entire working population. A union may
be legitimately concerned that particular employers are undermining the area
standards of employment by maintaining lower standards without being interested
in organizing that employer.' If an employer were free to pay less than the
contract standards, the cost savings would encourage him to subcontract as
much as possible, thereby diminishing the amount of work available for the
unit employees. To prohibit a labor union from protecting its members by
removing this major incentive to subcontract work which would otherwise be
done by the unit employees would tend to destroy the bargaining unit through
loss of business or to force the primary employer to depress work standards in
order to meet competition. A clause which permits the employer to subcontract
unit work only to other employers adhering to contract standards equivalent to
those established in the contract minimizes this danger. It also provides more
flexibility to employers who must contract out to survive. Since there will be
firms which can meet contract standards, such a clause will not be used as a
device to gain recognition.
If the work standards clause goes beyond protecting the job opportunities
of the bargaining unit employees, it is secondary and forbidden by Section
8(e). If the union is seeking to protect the employment opportunities of its
members, including those not in the unit, or of union members in general, it
139 For example, the establishment of a pension plan in the construction industry.
140 358 U.S. 283 (1959). It should be noted that the Davis-Bacon Act constitutes an
imposed wage standard restriction on the general contractor in the construction industry.
141 Id. at 293-94. This position was reaffirmed in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
NLRB, 375 U.S. 963 (1964).
142 335 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
143 Id. at 715-16.
144 International Hod Carriers Union (the Calumet Contractors Ass'n case), 133 N.L.R.B.
512 (1961).
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has the secondary object of being directed toward the terms and conditions
of employment of employees not represented by them. Such a clause is a non-
mandatory subject of bargaining'4 5 and, if carried out, would violate Section
8(b) (2). This is not to say that employees in a bargaining group do not have
an interest in what happens to other union members, but that Congress, in
enacting Section 8(b) (4) (B), deemed such a relationship too remote when
weighed against the spread of disputes. 4 ' In view of this, the Board has held
clauses aimed at other than the union employees as violative of the Act. " '
In the construction industry, there are found many clauses providing that
the subcontractor shall perform for the prime contractor in accordance with
all the terms of the prime contract. The Court, in Building and Construction
Trades Council v. NLRB,'" held that such a clause required a union to adhere
to the full prime contractor's contract.'49 In E. L. Boggs Plastering Company,'
the Board upheld such a clause as being exempt by reason of the proviso 5'
where it appeared that all the subcontractors referred to were either members
of the multi-employer unit or could be under Board law. A problem arises
where the prime contract contains a recognitional clause and all subcontractors
would not constitute an appropriate multi-employer unit. It is possible under
such a clause that a subcontractor might be forced to recognize a union not
chosen by his employees. However, a more realistic reading would treat this
as a work standards clause requiring the employer to adhere to all non-recog-
nitional clauses. Of course, if the prime contract contains any other unlawful
clause, the subcontracting clause would be unlawful as attempting to bind the
subcontractor to a prime contractor's unlawful conduct.' 2
D. Sympathetic Action Clauses
All sides in Congress agreed that the LMRDA amendments to the Act
should not affect "struck work" and that the law developed under Section
8(b) (4) (B) should remain unaltered.' There are two branches of the struck
work doctrine: (1) farmed-out struck work and (2) chain-shop work. Both
branches, when embodied in subcontracting clauses, were held lawful under
Section 8(e) by the Board in Amalgamated Lithographers, Local 78 (the
Miami Post Co. case)."'
1. Farmed-out struck work: In the Miami Post Co. case the struck work
paragraph contained two parts: a general statement that the contracting com-
145 See text accompanying note 95 supra.
146 See text accompanying note 84 supra.
147 Automotive Employees Union (the Greater St. Louis Automotive Trimmers Ass'n case),
134 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1961).
148 328 F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
149 Id. at 541-42.
150 International Hod Carriers Union (the E. L. Boggs Plastering Co. case), 1964 CCH
LAB. L. REP. 1 13664 (Dec. 15, 1964).
151 The Board did not discuss why the clause came within Section 8(e). In view of the
fact that the Board said that the clause could be enforced under Section 8(b) (4) (B), it is
likely that the Board also considered the clause primary and exempt from Section 8(e).
152 Cement Masons, Local 97, 1964 CCH LAB. L. REP. 1 13597 (Nov. 30, 1964).
153 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
AcT 1360 (1959).
154 Amalgamated Lithographers (the Miami Post Co.. case), 130 N.L.R.B. 968, 974 (struck
work), 975 (chain shop) (1961).
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pany would not render production assistance to any employer whose plant
was struck by the International, and an implementation clause which provided
that employees would not be required to handle any work "farmed out" by
such employer other than work which the contracting employer had customarily
performed for the struck employer. The Board, relying on Section 8(b) (4) (B)
cases1 55 and emphasizing the fact that the clause specifically preserved the con-
tracting employer's right to continue to do work which he had customarily
performed for the struck employer, held this clause lawful. The result of an
effective primary strike is to shut down the employer's operation. If the struck
employer can avoid the strike's impact by having another employer perform
the struck work, then the strike would fail. In such a situation, the law looks
behind the facts to see that the primary-secondary dichotomy has broken down
and tries to administer the Act to prevent the primary employer from avoiding
the impact of the strike on his own business. If the secondary (contracting)
employer purposefully and knowingly enhances the economic strength of the
primary (struck) employer, the secondary, by engaging in such conduct in-
consistent with his professed neutrality, has abandoned his neutral status and
joined cause with the primary and should be subject to the same economic
pressures. In such a situation, the secondary employees are being used as replace-
ments for the strikers and are, therefore, being forced to become involuntary
strike breakers. What has happened is a switch in the roles of the parties-
the contracting employer's and the struck employers joint venture is that the
primary employees and secondary employees, as employees of the joint venture,
are now primary employees entitled to all the rights of primary employees, in-
cluding the right to strike their employer. Since Section 8 (e) prohibits employers
from ceasing to do business with another person, the contracting employees, by
refusing to perform services for their own employer, the joint venture, do not
come within the scope of the Act.15
2. The Chain-Shop clause: This clause recognizes the right of employees
to strike if employees in another plant "wholly or commonly owned and con-
trolled" are on strike or have been locked out. The company at which the
strike occurs must be one with the contracting employer at which the sympathy
strike occurs. A factor frequently stressed in finding a single employer is cen-
tralized control over labor relations. In Miami Post the Board construed the
chain-shop clause to mean that a strike at the plant of the contracting employer in
sympathy with a strike at the plant of another company which is a separate
legal entity is permitted, provided that the two legal entities, because of com-
mon control and ownership, constitute a single employer within the meaning
of the Act, and held it lawful."'r Here again, it follows that if there is but a
single employer, all the employees are primary employees and, since Section
155 NLRB v. Business Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics Union, 228 F.2d 553 (2d
Cir. 1955); Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
156 The above analysis applies only where the contracting employer is receiving work from
the struck employer. It would not apply to the situation where the contracting employer re-
ceives the work from a general contractor who gives them work which was formerly done by
a subcontractor whose employees are on strike. Truck Drivers Union (the Patton Warehouse
case), 140 N.L.R.B. 1474, 1483 (1964).
157 Amalgamated Lithographers, 130 N.L.R.B. 968, 975 (1961).
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8(e) deals solely with action aimed at another "employer" or another person,
a chain shop or sympathetic action clause would not come within the prohibi-
tion of the Act.
What if the struck plant's clause gave the employees in other plants of
the employer the right to take economic action against their own plant? This
is the reverse of the normal chain-shop clause discussed above. The fact that
the clause is with one part, rather than another part, of a single enterprise
appears to be irrelevant to the employees affected. In fact, the Board in Central
States Painting and Decorating Co. 5 ' held that a local in one jurisdiction
had a right to require an employer to adhere to the lawful provision of a col-
lective bargaining agreement between the employer and a local of a second
jurisdiction which required the employer to adhere to all lawful clauses in effect
in other geographic jurisdictions.15" In Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n,"6°
the Board applied the above ruling to a subcontracting clause.' 6'
E. Termination Clauses
The "right-to-terminate" clause provides that the union shall have the
right to terminate the contract in the event that the employer violates the
agreement. Thus, the termination clause gives the union a remedy in the form
of self-help for a violation of another clause. The Board in Miami Post held
that the lawfulness of this clause would depend on that of the clause it is being
used to implement.162 Therefore, a decision as to the legality of a particular
subcontracting clause will also determine the status of the termination clause.
F. Picket Line Clauses
While not a subcontracting clause, a picket line clause, which is found
in many contracts, is considered because of its possible effect on other clauses
in a contract. In Patton Warehouse6 the Board held unlawful a clause which
provided "it shall not be cause for discharge or disciplinary action in the event
an employee refuses to enter upon any property involved in a labor dispute or
refuses to go through or work behind any picket line . .. ," because it failed
to conform to the Section 8(b) proviso." 4 The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia,'6 5 while rejecting the Board's reliance upon the proviso, held that
Section 8(e) was inapplicable to clauses allowing employees to cross a lawful
primary picket line. 6 However, for the picket line proviso to have meaning,
it is possible that the proviso could exempt a union representing a third employer
158 Painters' Dist. Council (the Central States Painting & Decorating Co. case), 1964 CCH
L~m. L. REP. 13142 (May 22, 1964).
159 Id. at 20,962-63.
160 Locals 22 and 113, Int'l Ass'n of Heat Workers (the Houston Insulation Contractors
Ass'n case), 1964 CCH LAB. L. REP. 1 13401 (Sept. 4, 1964).
161 Id. at 21,458-59.
162 130 N.L.R.B. 968, 977 (1961).
163 140 N.L.R.B. 1474 (1963).
164 Id. at 1478.
165 Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
166 In Truck Drivers Local 696 (the Freeto Constr. Co. case), 1964 CCH LAB. L. REP.
13491 (Oct. 20, 1964), the Board did not except to the position of the Court and appears to
affirm the Court's view.
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from refusing to cross a picket line at a secondary employer's premises where
the secondary employees are engaged in a secondary boycott strike approved
by their representatives.'6 7
G. Savings Clauses
In Miami Post the Teamsters' contract contained a separability clause
which provided that certain clauses were not to become effective until they had
been declared valid by the Board or an appellate court. The Board found the
clause ineffective because:
Section 8(b) (4) (A) prohibits strikes for the purpose of re-
quiring an employer "to enter into any agreement which is pro-
hibited by Section 8(e)." We have found above that the "trade
shop" clause would be unlawful if agreed to by the parties. Accord-
ingly, a strike for the purpose of forcing the employer to agree to
such a provision is unlawful under Section 8(b) (4) (A). The strike
is not made lawful by the "separability" clause. We are not required
to decide whether the clause in question would effectively defer
the operation of the "trade shop" and "refusal to handle!' clauses,
if the parties agreed to them. The complaint in this case alleges
a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A) and not of 8(e). Whatever the
ultimate effect of the "separability" clause, the fact is that the
Respondents did strike to compel the Charging Parties to agree to
provisions in a contract which are prohibited by Section 8(e).*61,
The Board's ruling is probably unsound. For a violation of Section 8(b)
(4) (A), there must be a violation of Section 8(e). The Board's position is
inconsistent. If the clause has no life by reason of the savings clause for pur-
poses of Section 8(e), it necessarily follows that it is not prohibited by Section
8(e) and, hence, no Section 8(b) (4) (A) violation can be found. Even if
both parties together could seek a declaratory order from the Board passing
on the validity of the clause, this would be of little value. Normally, employers
are extremely reluctant to yield to union requests for subcontracting clauses
and when they do yield, they usually only give in to the most limited clauses
possible. For a union to seek any more than this, it must use economic pressure.
One answer might be for unions to submit the clause in advance for a ruling
as to its validity. However, with the amount of work undertaken by the Board,
it is unlikely that it would be willing to assume the added burden of advisory
rulings. But the situation presented by Miami Post is the normal situation in
which a declaratory order is appropriate. Until the Board clarifies its position
on declaratory orders, it is unlikely that savings clauses will fare any better than
did the clause in Miami Post.
Conclusion
At this point an author usually sums up the law to date and predicts
where it is going. However, neither is possible with this subject. The reason
is that the Board and the courts have had little time to work with the law in
167 Even if the strike is not approved, a clause aimed solely at discharge, but not disci-
pline or replacement, might be valid in any case.
168 Amalgamated Lithographers (the Miami Post Co. case), 130 N.L.R.B. 968, 978 (1961).
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order to develop guidelines. It must be remembered that the Board has de-
veloped the law on subcontracting clauses from nothing. Congress, in its zeal
to punish all unions for the deeds of the Teamsters, did not adequately con-
sider the law it was passing. What can be said is that the Board has adopted
the law of Section 8(b) (4) (B), especially the primary-secondary dichotomy,
and will uphold work preservation and work standards clauses to the extent
they demonstrate a primary objective. Beyond this, it would be foolish to ven-
ture since the variety of possible subcontracting clauses is without limit. We
can only hope that with the passage of time the Board, with the aid of the courts
and labor commentators, will develop sensible law from the chaos handed it
by Congress.
